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Abstract 
The competing principles framework for analysing Australian Indigenous 
affairs is revisited, starting with Rowse on ‘the Coombs experiment’. Rowse 
rehabilitates this term from pejorative critics, arguing that all government 
policy in Indigenous affairs is experimental. The task becomes one of 
characterising changing patterns of government experiment since the 
Commonwealth became involved in Indigenous affairs on a national scale 
after the 1967 constitutional alteration referendum. This paper develops 
a two-phase characterisation, changing from the millennium. The first 
phase is discussed under the heading ‘Indigenous-Specific Structures and 
Programs’, the second under the heading ‘Welfare reform, Contractualism 
and Normalisation’. The name Pearson is as synonymous with the second 
phase as Coombs is with the first. Rowse has much to offer on both these 
prominent personalities and phases, as well as a complementary schema to 
the competing principles focused on peoples and populations.
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Introduction
‘The Coombs Experiment’ was the title given by 
Tim Rowse to a 2010 lecture on the contribution of 
H.C. Coombs to Commonwealth Indigenous affairs 
policy in the quarter century after the 1967 ‘Aboriginals’ 
constitutional alteration referendum and legislation. The 
phrase was not Rowse’s own, but one gleaned from recent 
critics of Coombs, starting with Geoffrey Partington in 
1996 and the likes of Gary Johns and Helen Hughes in the 
post-millennial period. Rowse’s purpose was only partly to 
defend Coombs from the ‘caricature’ and ‘political hubris’ 
of these ‘revisionist policy intellectuals’, with his ‘antidote’ 
of some ‘competent biography’ (Rowse 2012d: 183). 
The more substantial purpose of Rowse’s lecture was to 
argue that Indigenous affairs policy in a colonial, settler-
majority society like Australia is inevitably and correctly 
‘experimental’. To call Coombs experimental is no longer 
‘pejorative’, but simply positions him in a longer historical 
tradition. As Rowse puts it: 
The Coombs experiment has been a chapter in a 
longer experiment that British people initiated by 
colonising this continent; that longer experiment is a 
continuing self-interested exploration of the ways in 
which Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australians are 
similar and different (Rowse 2012d: 196).
Every ‘project of government’ in Indigenous affairs, 
Rowse argues, is an ‘exploratory testing of the relative 
significance of human sameness and cultural difference 
between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australia’ which 
produces ‘knowledge’ in need of ‘interpretation’ (Rowse 
2012d: 174–5, 196).
In this paper, I explore further Rowse’s idea that 
Indigenous affairs is an ongoing series of experiments 
in human sameness, or equality, and cultural difference. 
I trace the changing forms of those experiments in the 
period of Commonwealth involvement in a national role 
since 1967. I divide the period into two phases: an initial, 
exploratory three decades to the 1990s, then a revisionist 
phase since the millennium. For a conceptual frame, I 
revisit a triangular schema of competing principles that 
incorporates, but goes beyond, the dichotomy of equality 
and difference (Sanders 2010). By considering whether 
difference is seen positively or negatively, the schema 
also introduces the principles of choice (or autonomy) and 
guardianship (or protection). I argue that the balancing 
of these competing philosophical principles has 
changed from the first three decades of Commonwealth 
involvement in Indigenous affairs on a national scale to 
the post-millennial period. There have, as a consequence, 
been some significant changes in the forms of 
government experiment during these two modern, federal 
phases of Indigenous affairs. The first phase, in which 
H.C. Coombs was prominent, is discussed under the 
heading ‘Indigenous-Specific Structures and Programs’. 
The second phase, in which Noel Pearson is prominent, 
is discussed under the heading ‘Welfare Reform, 
Contractualism and Normalisation’. Some conceptual 
assistance in telling this history is drawn from Rowse, 
whose work offers insights on Coombs and Pearson, as 
well as some ideas for refining the competing principles 
framework by identifying two idioms of social justice 
focused on peoples and populations.
Competing principles of equality, 
choice and guardianship
The dominant principle in Australian Indigenous affairs 
has always seemed to me, during thirty years of 
observation, to be equality or human sameness: that, 
in some way, Indigenous and settler Australians both 
are and ought to be equal. The competing idea that 
Indigenous Australians are historically and culturally 
different (and that this should be reflected in government 
policy) can also be argued persuasively but has less 
power than the equality principle (Sanders 2005, 2008a). 
Difference can be seen positively—as a reflection of 
freedom, autonomy and choice—or negatively, as the 
result of ‘powerful structures’ of ‘social determination’ 
that limit ‘opportunity’ (Rowse 2002: 7). If difference 
is seen negatively, this can invoke the competing 
principle of protection or guardianship which suggests 
that certain people are not adequate judges of their 
own best interests and must be guided by others, 
such as government agents. Fig. 1 is a simple graphic 
representation of the relationships in Indigenous affairs 
between these four key concepts of equality, difference, 
choice and guardianship. The dominance of equality 
is reflected in its position at the apex of the triangle. 
Difference is placed at the bottom of the triangle, 
suggesting its less dominant status, and with positive and 
negative marks on either side. This leads to the alternative 
principles of choice at one lower point of the triangle and 
guardianship at the other.1 I refer to this triangle as the 
ECG of Australian Indigenous affairs, the source of its 
animation and life: a deliberate play on the acronym also 
standing for electrocardiogram.
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FIG. 1.  Competing principles in Australian 
Indigenous affairs: simple representation
Two elaborations of this simple analytic schema lead 
to some further refinement. The first is the idea that 
the equality principle can be interpreted in some 
very different ways, while the second is that among 
Indigenous Australians there can be different levels of 
‘choosing selves’ or actors, ranging from the individual 
person and family or household to the ‘organized 
communal agency’ (Rowse 2002: 19). Two competing 
interpretations of the equality principle are individual legal 
equality and socio-economic equality measured among 
population sub-groups. The former is placed on the right 
of the triangle half way down from the apex, and the latter 
in a similar position on the left of the triangle. While these 
are testable interpretations of the equality principle, the 
interpretation of equality placed at the apex of the triangle 
is the more philosophical (and less testable) idea of 
equality of opportunity (see Fig. 2). 
FIG. 2 .  Competing principles in Australian 
Indigenous affairs: elaborated representation
These competing interpretations of the equality 
principle in the top quarter of the triangular analytic 
schema are largely about Indigenous actors who are 
individual persons and family households, aggregated 
for measurement into population sub-groups. At the 
Equality
Choice Guardianship
+ Dfference –
Equality of 
opportunity
Group choice/
autonomy
Group
guardianship+ Group difference –
and diversity
 – Individual & household + 
difference 1960s
1930s
 Socio-economic equality
in population subgroups
(& guardianship?)
 Individual legal equality
(& choice)
bottom left of the triangle, by contrast, the Indigenous 
actors tend to be self-identified corporate groups, such 
as organisations, settlements, communities or even 
‘peoples’ (Rowse 2012b). There is also a corporate 
character to the groups identified for protection and 
guardianship in the bottom right of the triangle, although 
these are more likely to be externally defined than self-
identified (see Fig. 2).
Another feature of Fig. 2 is that, in the middle of the 
triangle, at the level of individual or household actors, 
the positive and negative views of difference are 
reversed from those at the base of the triangle involving 
group choice and guardianship. The individual legal 
equality interpretation tends to see individual and 
household difference quite positively, as the result of 
freedom and autonomy, whereas the socio-economic 
equality interpretation tends to see such difference 
more negatively, as the result of such things as social 
determination and lack of opportunity. It would seem, 
therefore, that the choice and guardianship principles 
may be on opposite sides of the triangle at the level 
of individual and household actors compared with the 
lower level involving corporate groups (see Fig. 2). There 
may thus be two ECG triangles in the Indigenous affairs 
policy space, with reversed polarities around valuations 
of difference at the different levels of Indigenous actors. 
Interpretations of difference are thus quite complex on 
both the left and right sides of the Indigenous affairs 
policy space, depending on the level of Indigenous 
agency being considered.2 
This elaborated left–right triangular model of the 
Indigenous affairs policy space represented in Fig. 2 
has taken some time to develop and may not yet have 
reached its final form. It is an analytic schema that has 
grown from thirty years observing Australian Indigenous 
affairs and reading other people’s work, most particularly 
Rowse’s. In the history that follows, I argue that dominant 
debates in Indigenous affairs policy have occupied 
different parts of this triangular space during the two 
experimental phases of Commonwealth involvement 
in Indigenous affairs in a national role up to the 1990s 
and since the turn of the millennium. As a prelude, a 
final addition to Fig. 2 is to suggest that, in the three 
decades before the 1967 referendum, dominant debates 
and government experiments in Australian Indigenous 
affairs moved from group protection in the bottom right 
of the triangle to individual legal equality higher on the 
right side of the triangle. In a somewhat mechanical 
way, all references to Aboriginals were removed from 
the Commonwealth Constitution in 1967, thereby 
achieving a high point for the principle of individual legal 
equality.3 The effect of this removal was to extend the 
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Commonwealth’s ‘race’ power at section 51(xxvi) to 
cover laws relating to Aboriginal people in the various 
States, thereby giving the Commonwealth a clear head 
of constitutional power on which to build its nationwide 
involvement in Indigenous affairs. The Commonwealth’s 
previous involvement had been through its Territories, 
under section 122 of the Constitution. Most substantially, 
this had been in the Northern Territory, surrendered to 
the Commonwealth by South Australia in 1911. Among 
Australian subnational jurisdictions, the Northern Territory 
has long had by far the highest Aboriginal proportion 
of population, due largely to a small settler population. 
Being the government for the Northern Territory from 1911 
thus endowed the Commonwealth with a leading role in 
Australian Indigenous affairs, but not a national role.
Indigenous-specific structures and 
programs: experiments until the 1990s
After the 1967 referendum, the Commonwealth began 
exploring its new national role by establishing a small 
Council for and Office of Aboriginal Affairs within the 
Prime Minister’s portfolio. This was done under Prime 
Minister Holt on the advice of H.C. Coombs, who 
became chair of the new three-man Council. After 
Holt’s untimely death at the end of 1967, under Gorton 
as Prime Minister from 1968 to 1971, a new minister-
in-charge of Aboriginal affairs was placed between 
the Office and Council and the Prime Minister. Under 
McMahon in 1971–72, the Council and Office were 
moved outside the Prime Minister’s portfolio into a 
new Department of Environment, Aborigines and the 
Arts. Coombs disapproved of both these moves away 
from the Holt model, but continued as chair of the 
Council for Aboriginal Affairs throughout this time and 
on until it was abandoned in 1976 (Coombs 1978: 1–25; 
Rowse 2000: 17–33).
In the Commonwealth Parliament during 1968, 
an Aboriginal Enterprises (Assistance) Act and a 
State Grants (Aboriginal Advancement) Act were 
passed, clearly using the Commonwealth’s extended 
constitutional power. While the first of these pieces of 
legislation was passed just once, the second became an 
annual event, identifying a Commonwealth budget for 
working with the States on Indigenous issues until 1974 
(McCorquodale 1987: 9–11). 
These pieces of legislation and the Office and Council 
were experiments in Indigenous-specific structures 
and programs within the Commonwealth machinery 
of government. The next three decades of Indigenous 
affairs were characterised by a preference for such 
structures and programs. Initially, under these Coalition 
governments, these experiments were undertaken in 
cooperation with the States. However, from the election of 
the Whitlam Labor government in December 1972, these 
experiments increasingly involved the Commonwealth 
in direct relationships with groups of Indigenous people 
that bypassed the States and, in the Northern Territory, 
bypassed elements of the Commonwealth’s own 
established regional administration.
To facilitate these new direct relationships with groups 
of Indigenous people, the Whitlam Labor government 
established a new Department of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA). 
In the Northern Territory, where the Commonwealth had 
full power as the subnational government as well, DAA 
simply incorporated the Territory Welfare Branch, which 
had previously dealt with Aboriginal issues. In the States, 
negotiations to transfer staff and responsibilities to DAA 
occurred under the Aboriginal Affairs (Arrangements 
with the States) Act 1973 and came to fruition in all 
States except Queensland (Sanders 1991). In line with 
these major changes, Commonwealth expenditure on 
‘Aboriginal assistance’ grew from around $30 million 
in 1971–72 to almost $160 million in 1974–75, with the 
proportion spent on ‘Grants to the States’ decreasing 
from one-third to one-quarter (DAA 1975: 58–59; 
1977: 50–51). The increasing proportion of this rapidly 
growing Commonwealth expenditure was directed to 
Aboriginal community-based organisations in areas 
such as housing, health, community infrastructure, 
education, employment and legal aid. To facilitate this 
expenditure, and other Indigenous community affairs, 
the Whitlam government investigated the possibility of an 
incorporation statute specifically for Indigenous groups. 
The Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976 was 
duly passed by the Commonwealth Parliament, although 
not until the first year of the Fraser Coalition government. 
One further experiment of the Whitlam government was 
to establish an advisory National Aboriginal Consultative 
Committee, elected by Indigenous people from across 
Australia. First elected in November 1973, this first 
national Indigenous representative body had a tense 
relationship with the Whitlam government, leading to 
its being reviewed in 1976 under the incoming Fraser 
government (Hiatt 1976; Weaver 1983). This Coalition 
government also saw the sense of an elected national 
Indigenous representative body and, after the review, 
devised a lightly restructured National Aboriginal 
Conference, which went on to have two rounds of 
elections in 1977 and 1981 (Loveday & Jaensch 1982; 
Weaver 1983).
Another area of Indigenous-specific experimentation 
that spanned the terms of the Whitlam Labor and Fraser 
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Coalition Commonwealth governments was in the 
recognition of land rights. Whitlam established a Royal 
Commission to inquire into how Aboriginal land rights 
would be recognised. This focused on the Northern 
Territory, where the Commonwealth had full constitutional 
power, but also sought to establish a framework that 
could be taken up by the States (Whitlam 1985: 470). The 
direct outcome was the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern 
Territory) Act 1976, also passed by the Commonwealth 
Parliament during the first year of the Fraser government. 
More indirectly over the next decade and a half, 
Aboriginal land rights statutes applying to five States 
were developed—in South Australia (1981, 1984), New 
South Wales (1983), Victoria (1987, 1991), Queensland 
(1991) and Tasmania (1995) (Nettheim, Meyers & Craig 
2002: 237–317). Common law ‘native title’ was also 
discovered through the Mabo case decided in the High 
Court in 1992, which, through the subsequent Native Title 
Act 1993, led to an underlying national Commonwealth 
system of Indigenous rights in land that covered Western 
Australia as well (Russell 2006; Stephenson & Ratnapala 
1993). After the 1996 Wik case, the co-existence of native 
title rights with other land tenures was also seen as 
possible, prompting amendments to the Native Title Act 
in 1998 (Brennan 1998). The extent of Indigenous-specific 
rights to land is still being determined through claims 
processes overseen by tribunals and courts, but by 2012, 
these had led to Indigenous people holding 22 per cent of 
the Australian continent, and having some say over land 
use in a further 24 per cent (see Fig. 3).
FIG. 3 .  Land held by Indigenous people or subject to non-exclusive Indigenous rights, 2012
N
Source: Altman and Markham (2015).
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Returning to the 1970s, it is important to note the 
emergence of at least one other Indigenous-specific 
program, the Community Development Employment 
Projects (CDEP) scheme. Rowse has argued that this 
program, developed in 1977, was H.C. Coombs’ clearest 
influence on policy (Rowse 2012d: 178–9; see also 
Sanders 2012). CDEP was an alternative to the payment 
of unemployment benefits to Aboriginal people in remote 
areas, which was becoming widespread during the 1970s 
under the influence of ideas of non-discrimination and 
equal individual rights (Sanders 1985). Concerns about 
this extensive spread of unemployment benefits were 
substantial, and Coombs and DAA imagined a group-
based alternative under which Aboriginal organisations 
would employ community members part-time for the 
equivalent of their social security entitlements (Coombs 
1978: 202–3). This would give Aboriginal community 
organisations a degree of autonomy through a workforce 
and guaranteed funding. The Fraser Coalition government 
embraced the Coombs/DAA idea of CDEP for a trial list 
of remote Aboriginal communities, but faced ongoing 
resistance from other Commonwealth departments, 
unions and the Labor opposition (Sanders 1988). By 
Labor’s return to government in 1983, however, CDEP 
had bipartisan support. Over the next few years it was 
the Hawke Labor government that presided over the 
expansion of CDEP, not only to any remote Indigenous 
community that wanted it, but to nonremote Indigenous 
communities as well. CDEP became the DAA’s largest 
single budget item, accounting for one-quarter of 
expenditure by 1989–90 (Sanders 1993).
The 1990s saw an even bolder Commonwealth 
experiment with Indigenous-specific structures and 
programs—the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission (ATSIC). This Commonwealth statutory 
authority replaced DAA and combined it with a new 
structure of elected Indigenous representatives, 
building up from regional councils and zones to national 
commissioners. These executive and elected arms of 
ATSIC operated under a Commonwealth minister but 
were given considerable autonomy over the allocation of 
their budget and other decisions (Tickner 2001). Some 
argued from the outset that ATSIC would experience 
unresolvable tensions under the direction of both elected 
Aboriginal representatives and a minister (Wettenhall 
1989). But in many ways ATSIC managed these 
tensions, and others, remarkably well for over a decade 
(Sanders 1994, 2004; Sullivan 1996). ATSIC was a bold 
experiment in Indigenous self-determination, which 
was both within government but also allowed elected 
Aboriginal representatives considerable independence. 
Internationally, ATSIC became an accredited Non-
Government Organisation at the United Nations in 1995, 
while domestically, ATSIC decentralised some of its 
decision making to its elected regional councils. Like 
DAA before it, ATSIC ran Indigenous-specific programs, 
like CDEP and its large Community Housing and 
Infrastructure Program (CHIP), which were consciously 
adapted to the different circumstances of Indigenous 
people across Australia. ATSIC’s strategic challenge, like 
DAA’s before it, was to run these Indigenous-specific 
programs as supplements, while also encouraging line 
departments at all levels of Australian government to 
service Aboriginal citizens (Altman & Sanders 1995).
The relationship between DAA’s and ATSIC’s Indigenous-
specific programs and line government departments 
was often complex. Many of these line departments also 
developed Indigenous-specific programs to supplement 
Indigenous access to their general programs. For 
example, a major Aboriginal Study Grants scheme had 
been developed around 1970 and remained located in 
the Commonwealth’s education department throughout 
the lives of both DAA and ATSIC, despite these latter also 
developing Indigenous-specific education programs. In 
health, tension grew during the 1980s over the respective 
roles of the Indigenous-specific and line agencies, with 
DAA and later ATSIC for a while given a lead role. By 
the mid 1990s, however, community-based Indigenous 
health organisations wanted Indigenous-specific health 
programs transferred from ATSIC to the Department of 
Health, and the Keating Labor government obliged, much 
to the consternation of many within ATSIC (Anderson 
& Sanders 1996). Budget-related papers of the period 
showed that Commonwealth expenditure on Indigenous-
specific programs was about half from line departments, 
and half from ATSIC and other small Indigenous-specific 
agencies (Tickner 1992). The big spenders among line 
departments were employment and education, with 
Indigenous-specific expenditure through the health 
department increasing rapidly after 1995 (Herron 1998). 
All these experiments with Indigenous-specific structures 
and programs from the 1970s to the 1990s were 
undertaken in the name of self-determination or self-
management and also, to some extent, as restitution 
for past colonial injustices (Sanders 1982, 2000). In 
the triangular analytic schema, they occupied a space 
towards the bottom left in which group autonomy or 
choice was emphasised, sometimes to the extent 
of people-hood. But these experiments also had to 
compete with some very strong ideas about pursuing 
socio-economic equality between Indigenous and settler 
Australians as population sub-groups, as measured in 
instruments like the census (Altman 1991; Australian 
Government 1987). For this reason I depict the Indigenous 
affairs policy debates of the 1970s to 1990s as occupying 
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the left three-quarters of the triangle, stretching from 
individualised equality of opportunity at the apex, to 
population-based socio-economic equality halfway down 
and group autonomy and peoplehood at the bottom left, 
while also occasionally still referencing equal individual 
legal rights (see Fig. 4). This range of competing 
principles encompassed large areas for debate, but in 
retrospect possibly not large enough as it omitted the 
guardianship principle at the level of Indigenous groups. 
Debate also covered the respective roles of Indigenous-
specific and general programs, and their location in 
Indigenous-specific or line government agencies.
FIG. 4 .  Competing principles in Australian 
Indigenous affairs: dominant debates of the 
1970s–1990s
This pattern of debate in Australian Indigenous 
affairs began to change under the Howard Coalition 
Commonwealth government elected in 1996. The new 
government deferred from 1996 until 1999 a provision for 
electing, rather than appointing, the ATSIC Chairperson 
(Sanders, Taylor & Ross 2000). In the name of public 
accountability, the new minister also started to restrict 
the autonomy of the ATSIC Board in making funding 
and other decisions (Ivanitz 2000). By 1998, the Howard 
government had also abandoned Australia’s support 
for the term ‘self-determination’ in the Draft Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which was slowly 
emerging through the United Nations Working Group 
on Indigenous Populations (Dodson & Pritchard 1998). 
However, perhaps the clearest sign of change in 
Indigenous affairs debates came not from within the 
Howard government, but from a Cape York Aboriginal 
leader who had emerged on the Queensland and national 
stages during the 1990s—Noel Pearson. A lawyer and 
historian, Pearson had been central to negotiations over 
native title legislation between the Commonwealth and 
Indigenous people both during 1993, in the wake of the 
Mabo decision, and in 1997–98 after the High Court’s 
Wik decision (Brennan 1998; Goot & Rowse 1993). After 
this focus on land law in the 1990s, Pearson turned his 
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attention to what he saw as the pressing and neglected 
issue of long-term Aboriginal dependence on welfare. In 
a self-published essay in 2000, directed as much to his 
Aboriginal compatriots in Cape York as to governments, 
Pearson began with the following contention:
If we are to survive as a people
We have to get passive welfare out of Aboriginal 
governance in Cape York Peninsula
We have to get rid of the passive welfare mentality 
that has taken over our people (Pearson 2000: 3).
This was the beginning of some very substantial changes 
in Australian Indigenous affairs policy debates. 
Welfare reform, contractualism 
and normalisation: experiments 
after the millennium
Pearson provided a powerful and persuasive analysis 
of what had gone wrong in Indigenous affairs over the 
decades leading up to the millennium. Interestingly, his 
analysis was not directed against the policies of the 
‘self-determination’ era, but rather to the slowly emerging 
perverse consequences of equal individual rights:
After we became citizens with equal rights and 
equal pay, we lost our place in the real economy. 
What is the exception among white fellas—almost 
complete dependence on cash handouts from 
the government—is the rule for us. There is no 
responsibility and reciprocity built into our present 
artificial economy, which is based on passive welfare 
(money for nothing) (Pearson 2000: 5).
Pearson saw restoring ‘traditional values of responsibility’ 
as the way out of this predicament, and he saw this 
as part of the ‘struggle for rights’, including self-
determination—‘the right to self-determination is 
ultimately the right to take responsibility’ (Pearson 2000: 
5). He argued that Aboriginal people did not have ‘a right 
to passive welfare’ and that they should ‘no longer accept 
it’. Rather they had a ‘right to build a real economy’ 
(Pearson 2000: 5).
Pearson developed a high public profile advocating these 
ideas in the immediate post-millennial period, including 
giving the inaugural Charles Perkins Memorial Oration at 
Sydney University with a very confronting title (Pearson 
2001). Developing a program for policy change based on 
this analysis was a further challenge, and in 2004, to help 
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do so, Pearson established the Cape York Institute for 
Policy and Leadership (CYIPL) as a Cairns-based offshoot 
of Griffith University. Also in 2004, the Howard Coalition 
government received an unexpected opportunity from the 
Latham Labor opposition, which responded to a review 
of ATSIC by declaring that, if elected to government later 
that year, Labor would abolish ATSIC, its own creation of 
15 years earlier. Howard seized this opportunity, declaring 
ATSIC a ‘failure’ as an elected Indigenous representative 
body that would be ‘abolished’ forthwith and its programs 
‘mainstreamed’ to line government departments (Howard 
& Vanstone 2004). Pearson’s commentary of the time 
(2004a, 2004b) identified some significant weaknesses 
in ATSIC and did not resist its abolition. This distanced 
Pearson from many of his Indigenous compatriots, 
who were more inclined to defend ATSIC now that it 
was under attack.4 Pearson’s stance also indicated his 
ongoing willingness and determination to work with the 
Howard Coalition government on welfare reform.
These events in 2004 marked the outbreak of a 
‘generational revolution’ in Australian Indigenous affairs 
(Sanders 2008b). This involved a re-engineering of 
Indigenous-specific structures and programs within 
the Commonwealth government and a move towards a 
greater alignment with general programs. Indigenous-
specific structures and programs did not disappear, 
but were pushed in various ways towards greater 
‘normalisation’ (Sullivan 2011). I will illustrate this 
argument by recounting what happened to ATSIC’s two 
big-budget programs, CDEP and CHIP, after they were 
assigned to line government departments in 2004.
CDEP was the subject of two rounds of review and reform 
while based in the Department of Employment and 
Workplace Relations (DEWR) from July 2004 until the fall 
of the Howard Coalition government in November 2007. 
Each round was built on a discussion paper proposing 
reforms after consultations (DEWR 2005a, 2005b, 2006). 
The net effects of the reforms, which changed little after 
consultations, were threefold. One was to cease CDEP 
in urban areas, reducing participant numbers by 7,000 
(out of 35,000) from July 2007. A second was to bring 
treatment of CDEP participants more in line with that of 
job-seekers in DEWR’s general system of outsourced 
employment services, the Job Network. A third was to 
change the funding of CDEP provider organisations from 
July 2006 to a competitive, multiyear contract (Sanders 
2007). This last was a very significant change from the 
annual grant funding of ATSIC and DAA, through which 
the vast majority of CDEP organisations had been loyally 
supported over many years as major contributors to 
their communities. DEWR exposed the Indigenous-
specific CDEP providers for the first time to the new 
public management of periodic, competitive contracting 
out of government services, which had so dramatically 
transformed general employment services in Australia a 
decade earlier (Considine 1999).
With the election of the Rudd Labor Commonwealth 
government in late 2007, CDEP was moved out of DEWR 
into the Department of Families, Housing, Community 
Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA). The pace 
of reform now quickened, with three ministers spanning 
two departments authoring the next review discussion 
paper (Gillard, Macklin & O’Connor 2008). The resulting 
changes brought CDEP more in line with payments 
in the social security system and also moved it away 
from being regarded as employment. From July 2009, 
new participants would no longer be employed by their 
CDEP provider, but rather would be Newstart Allowance5 
recipients within the social security system while 
undertaking CDEP activities. CDEP was slowly being 
converted from a very distinctive Indigenous-specific 
program to a remote-area version of the general Work-
for-the-Dole program introduced in 1997. 
The final step in this process of reducing CDEP’s 
distinctive characteristics as an Indigenous-specific 
program was a review of ‘participation and employment’ 
services more generally in remote areas in 2011. Another 
discussion paper authored by three ministers suggested 
that CDEP should be ‘integrated’ with three other 
employment programs in remote areas, one Indigenous-
specific and two general. A ‘single provider’ would be 
funded to make participation and employment services 
‘simpler’ and ‘flexible enough to encourage providers 
and communities to be innovative’ (Arbib, Macklin & Ellis 
2011: 8). Thus emerged in 2012 the Remote Jobs and 
Communities Program (RJCP), with a single provider for 
each of 60 remote regions across Australia, contracts 
for which would begin in July 2013 (Macklin, Shorten & 
Collins 2012). This general, remote-area employment and 
community participation program subsumed the previous 
two general and two Indigenous-specific programs, 
and all that remained of CDEP was a few thousand 
‘grandfathered’ (pre-July 2009) participants allowed to 
stay on wages for a few more years.
The post-2004 reform of ATSIC’s other big-budget, 
distinctive, Indigenous-specific program—CHIP—
was also a story of normalisation towards general 
program structures. 
With the abolition of ATSIC, CHIP went to a department 
called Families and Community Services. Early in 2006, 
with a new minister, this department had ‘Indigenous 
Affairs’ added to its name, and then in late 2007, at the 
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time of the election of the Rudd Labor government, 
‘Housing’ was identified within it as a distinct ministerial 
responsibility. This department commissioned an external 
review of CHIP, which in early 2007 comprehensively 
condemned it. The review argued that the 616 Indigenous 
Community Housing Organisations then managing 
21,000 dwellings across Australia had, for a number 
of reasons, ‘not been able to maintain housing assets’ 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2007: 19). CHIP, it judged, ‘has 
not worked and cannot work’ (PricewaterhouseCoopers 
2007: 17). A ‘new strategic framework’ was recommended 
that would, among other things:
4. Increase the supply of public housing through 
transfer of community housing to public housing 
agencies where possible …
8. Continue the shift away from building housing on 
‘on country’ outstations and homelands and focus 
on building new housing where there is access to 
education, health, law and order and other basic 
services …
20. Foster homeownership on community-title land 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2007: 23–4).
The Coalition minister who received this review endorsed 
it strongly and in the May 2007 Budget announced a new 
Indigenous housing program focused on remote areas 
(Brough 2007a, 2007b). However, it was the incoming Rudd 
Labor Commonwealth government, elected at the end of 
2007, that gave these new arrangements greater shape. 
In April 2008, in conjunction with the Northern Territory 
Government, the Rudd government announced a four-
year program of housing investment for the Territory’s 
Indigenous communities, with ‘major capital works’ in 
16 of the more populous communities and ‘upgrades’ 
of existing houses in another 57 (Macklin, Henderson & 
Snowdon 2008). In March 2009 came the announcement 
of a 10-year National Partnership Agreement on Remote 
Indigenous Housing (NPARIH) endorsed by the Council 
of Australian Governments. This would involve the 
construction of 4,200 new houses in a select group of 
‘priority communities’ in remote areas of the Northern 
Territory, South Australia, Western Australia, Queensland 
and New South Wales, and ‘upgrades and repairs’ for 
another 4,800 more widely dispersed existing dwellings 
(Macklin 2009a). The ‘pre-condition’ for this investment 
was that the Commonwealth required ‘security of tenure’ 
in order ‘to protect assets and establish with absolute 
clarity who is responsible for tenancy management and 
ongoing repairs and maintenance’ (Macklin 2009b: 6). 
The Commonwealth foresaw State and Territory housing 
authorities undertaking these ‘normal’ responsibilities, 
with some possibility of contracting out to community 
housing organisations. It also foresaw Indigenous tenants 
taking on ‘normal tenancy agreements’ in the ‘drive 
to rebuild positive community values and behaviour’ 
(Macklin 2009b). These high housing hopes of the 
Commonwealth in 2008 and early 2009 soon confronted 
some hard Territory and State government realities, which 
meant that new construction and repairs were slow to 
commence. Undaunted, the Commonwealth presided 
over a ‘renegotiation’ of NPARIH in late 2009, introducing 
an element of competition for funding between the 
subnational jurisdictions from mid 2010 (Rudd & 
Macklin 2009). 
While these two large and very distinctive Indigenous-
specific programs from the self-determination era 
were undergoing reforms that were gradually making 
them more like general housing and employment 
programs run by line departments, other developments 
in Indigenous affairs were engaging with the idea of 
‘normalisation’ in a rather different way. Primary among 
these was the June 2007 Northern Territory Emergency 
Response, which saw the Commonwealth pass five 
pieces of legislation within six weeks and re-intervene 
in Indigenous communities in the Territory in a way not 
seen since before the granting of limited Territory self-
government in 1978 (Altman & Hinkson 2007; Heatley 
1990). Four of these pieces of rushed legislation related 
specifically to the Northern Territory. The fifth was 
social security legislation establishing the possibility of 
‘income management regimes’, not only in ‘declared’ 
areas of the Northern Territory but also in Cape York and 
potentially elsewhere in Australia. The legislation for these 
regimes was controversial as it specifically excluded 
them from the operation of the Commonwealth’s Racial 
Discrimination Act 1976 (Standing Committee on Legal 
and Constitutional Affairs 2007: 5–6, 13–15). These 
income management regimes related to Pearson’s 
welfare reform agenda, which had in the previous three 
years been further developed by CYIPL. It is to this that 
I turn before relating these developments back to the 
triangular analytic schema.
In May 2007, CYIPL produced its ‘Design 
Recommendations’ for a ‘Welfare Reform Project’ in four 
Indigenous communities in Cape York. The document 
combined Pearson’s style of historical argument with 
some slightly more economic analysis and a touch 
of social psychology (CYIPL 2007). The ‘capabilities’ 
approach was adopted from the development economics 
of Amartya Sen, and there was talk of having ‘rational 
incentives’, as well as laws, so that individuals and 
families would be encouraged to ascend a ‘staircase 
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of opportunity’ through their own ‘choice’ (CYIPL 
2007: 35). Internalised ‘social norms’ were added from 
social psychology as an even more ‘influential’ driver of 
‘behaviour’ (CYIPL 2007: 41). A Family Responsibilities 
Commission was recommended in each trial community, 
enacted under a Queensland statute, to ‘enforce 
obligations’ on recipients of ‘conditional’ welfare 
payments to ‘rebuild social norms’ (CYIPL 2007: 49). 
Also a ‘welfare pedestal’ was identified that Indigenous 
people would have to ‘climb off’ in order to ‘join the real 
economy’ (CYIPL 2007: 73). CDEP was seen as part of 
this ‘welfare pedestal’ as it provided jobs that ‘look and 
feel’ real, but ‘with few of the associated disciplines and 
benefits’ (CYIPL 2007: 74). Low-cost (‘or even no cost’) 
‘welfare housing’ was also seen as part of ‘passive 
welfare’, which would have to be reformed through ‘home 
ownership’ or at least through ‘normalised’ tenancies 
(CYIPL 2007: 108).
These CYIPL positions in 2007 were a significant 
development from Pearson’s earlier work. In 2000, 
Pearson had supported CDEP as based on the 
‘reciprocity and responsibility’ that he advocated, even 
if in practice in some communities CDEP had fallen 
back to being ‘not very distinguishable from the dole’ 
(Pearson 2000: 87–8). Housing was not discussed at all in 
Pearson’s earlier work, so the critique of low-cost social 
housing as part of ‘passive welfare’ was also a significant 
development in the CYIPL analysis.
A month after the publication of CYIPL’s major report, 
Pearson and CYIPL backed the Commonwealth’s 
emergency intervention into the Northern Territory and 
used the rushed legislation to establish an income 
management regime for their welfare reform project, 
complementing the Family Responsibilities Commission 
being developed under Queensland legislation. They also 
backed the changes being made to CDEP under DEWR 
in 2007, and those that were to follow under FaHCSIA 
in 2009. Their support for reforms to remote Indigenous 
housing under NPARIH was perhaps somewhat 
less clear, but this did not stop their four Cape York 
communities all being included among the 29 ‘priority 
locations’ for housing investment announced in April 
2009 (Macklin 2009b).6 In a characteristic ‘insider’ move 
(Sanders 2008c), Pearson and CYIPL seemed willing 
to accept NPARIH’s priority construction of new public 
housing in 2009 and deal later with their preferred idea of 
private home ownership.
In 2010, the income management regimes established 
in 2007 were made consistent with the Commonwealth’s 
Racial Discrimination Act. The new regime in the Northern 
Territory was extended to the whole jurisdiction, rather 
than just ‘declared’ areas, and thereby to non-Indigenous 
people. The minister promoting the legislation noted 
that income management was already being applied in 
two areas of Western Australia, as well as Cape York 
and the Northern Territory, and that ‘non-discriminatory 
income management’ would soon ‘be extended 
nationally to other disadvantaged regions’ (Macklin 
2010). Pearson strongly supported this legislative change 
as a ‘fundamental shift in policy’ back to ‘conditional 
welfare’ (Pearson 2010b). This was very different from his 
commentary on NPARIH housing reform earlier in 2010, 
which had slammed the re-engineered social housing 
arrangements in Queensland’s Indigenous communities 
and called, once again, for moves to private home 
ownership (Pearson 2010a). Since then, a mid-term review 
of NPARIH has identified that ‘breaking through remaining 
barriers to private home ownership’ on Indigenous land 
is one of the ‘challenges’ for its remaining five years 
(NPARIH 2013: 13). That 2013 review also suggested 
that while ‘capital works delivery’ quickened after the 
slow start in 2009–10, ‘reformed rent setting and tenant 
support have not kept pace … in all jurisdictions’ and that 
the ‘agreed target for full implementation of property and 
tenancy management’ has been pushed back to 2015 
(NPARIH 2013: 12). Normalising Indigenous housing is 
proving a more complex, long-term intergovernmental 
process than some other aspects of welfare reform, such 
as income support and employment services, where 
the Commonwealth dominates more clearly and can 
act unilaterally.
Analytically, I argue, these post-millennial policy 
processes have shifted dominant Indigenous affairs 
debates from the left three-quarters of the triangular 
policy space depicted in Fig. 4 to the right three-
quarters shown in Fig. 5. CYIPL’s (2007: 36) ‘staircase 
of opportunity’—which can only be ascended when 
‘individuals and families exercise responsibility’—
embraces the idea of equality of opportunity at the 
apex of the triangle. The ‘Closing the Gap’ agenda, 
which was prominent under the Rudd and Gillard Labor 
Commonwealth governments, suggests that socio-
economic equality between population sub-groups is still 
near the centre of policy debates. The 2010 development 
of a ‘non-discriminatory’ income management regime 
suggests that individual legal equality is also still part 
of Indigenous affairs policy debates. What has returned 
to prominence in these recent debates is a renewed 
emphasis on group guardianship, with those identified 
for guidance often being described as remote or discrete 
Indigenous communities. These groups designated 
for guardianship are often those that, in the earlier 
decolonising self-determination and land-rights phase of 
Indigenous policy, were accorded a degree of autonomy 
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as peoples (Coombs 1994). However, group guardianship 
in this new policy phase is also often defined in terms 
of social groups who are seen as vulnerable (e.g. young 
children, women or the elderly) or at risk (e.g. unemployed 
youth and the long-term unemployed). The move back 
to group guardianship has thus also involved some 
re-imagining of the relevant collectivities of Indigenous 
social life.
Populations, peoples and the 
competing principles
Rowse’s recent analysis of Indigenous affairs focuses on 
two ‘notions of social justice’ supported by the different 
‘idioms’ of populations and peoples (Rowse 2012b: 7). 
Peoples, he argues, are ‘rights-bearing’ entities with ‘a 
distinct identity, heritage, institutions and land base’, 
as well as some ‘self-conscious organs of collective 
agency’. Populations, by contrast, are mere categories 
‘within a nation’s official statistical account of millions 
of individuals and households’ (Rowse 2012b: 5–6), This 
is not to belittle the populations idiom, which Rowse 
sees as ‘important and necessary’ in both ‘Indigenous 
self-representation and state recognition’ (Rowse 2012b: 
8). Rowse argues that both idioms have strengths and 
vulnerabilities, and that both are used by Indigenous 
intellectuals in policy debates to considerable effect 
(Rowse 2012b: 7).7 Rowse does, however, recount a 
history of the rise of the Indigenous peoples idiom, both 
in Australia and internationally, from about the late 1950s. 
He also wonders, in a later essay, whether developments 
in the Australian Reconciliation Barometer since 2008 
might be losing sight of the peoples idiom and reverting 
solely to a focus on disadvantaged populations (Rowse 
2012c). Hence, although Rowse does not address the 
competing principles framework directly, some of his 
analysis is consistent with the idea that recent policy 
debate has moved away from the bottom left of the policy 
triangle, where ideas of peoples and group autonomy are 
the guiding principle (see Fig. 5).
However, the peoples idiom has not completely 
disappeared. The issue of constitutional recognition of 
Indigenous Australians, which has been slowly building 
since late 2007, is conducted almost entirely in the 
peoples idiom (Dodson & Leibler 2012). If successful 
through bipartisan support (as now seems a possibility), 
constitutional recognition will move Australia’s founding 
document more to a peoples approach than at any time 
in the past (Joint Select Committee 2014). One way to 
understand this possibility is to argue that Indigenous 
policy debates have not entirely vacated the bottom 
left quarter of the competing principles triangle, or 
alternatively, that a peoples approach can extend across 
to the bottom right of the triangle. I suggest that elements 
of both these alternatives are occurring simultaneously, 
with a peoples approach to constitutional recognition 
being somewhere near the bottom centre of the triangle 
(see Fig. 5).
FIG. 5 .  Competing principles in Australian 
Indigenous affairs: dominant debates in 
the 2000s
In another recent essay Rowse suggests that Pearson’s 
writings on Indigenous issues are almost always about 
peoples and seldom about populations. Pearson only 
very occasionally uses the statistical catalogue of 
Indigenous disadvantage that is so characteristic of the 
populations idiom. Rather, Pearson writes histories of 
peoples at different geographic scales, from the local 
to the national, involving law, politics and economics. 
What Rowse finds most fascinating about Pearson’s 
economic histories is the way in which they have ‘steadily 
lost focus on the cultural specificity of Indigenous 
Australian people-hood, in order to dwell on what 
Indigenous Australians have in common with other poor 
people in the developed world’ (Rowse 2012a: 158–9). 
Pearson prioritises economic context, but also insists on 
talking about peoples rather than the socio-economic 
disadvantage of Indigenous populations. This is an 
uncommon and fascinating combination.
One other question arising from the competing principles 
triangle is whether group guardianship can be applied to 
peoples. Pearson has argued for the last decade and a 
half that elements of guardianship are needed in relation 
to the Indigenous peoples of Cape York. However, 
he has been sceptical from the start that external 
government authorities can enforce such guardianship, 
and has looked to local Indigenous community leaders 
to take on the role (Pearson 2000: 86-7). In more recent 
times, Pearson has argued for ‘individuals, families and 
communities’ arrogating to themselves ‘power that for 
too long has been assumed by government’ (Pearson 
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2011). These ideas raise the intriguing possibility of group 
guardianship being built on local community authority 
more than nation–state authority. Guardianship and its 
relationship to Indigenous peoples is complex, but it does 
seem that a peoples approach can be adopted within the 
bottom right corner of the policy triangle.
I argue that the best experimentalism in Australian 
Indigenous policy would completely fill the triangle of 
competing principles. To do so would require thinking 
both in the populations idiom and in the peoples idiom. 
It would also mean simultaneously entertaining both 
positive and negative views of Indigenous difference 
at different levels of actors, from the individual and 
household to the organised community agency. This is 
no easy task but, within this schema, it is the ultimate 
challenge of doing Indigenous affairs well. 
Where now? Experiments under 
the Abbott government
The Abbott Coalition government (elected in September 
2013) may appear, at an organisational level, to be 
reversing some of the experiments of the years since 
ATSIC. A range of Indigenous-specific programs similar 
to those dispersed from ATSIC a decade ago have 
now been drawn back together in one Commonwealth 
organisation. This time, to facilitate Abbott’s interest in 
being a Prime Minister for Indigenous affairs, that single 
organisation is the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet. In the last year, this department has changed 
from being a small, Canberra-only Commonwealth 
agency with fewer than 500 employees to a networked 
national organisation with over 2000 employees in 
multiple regional locations. The networked department 
is now implementing a new funding structure, the 
Indigenous Advancement Strategy, in five broad streams, 
replacing what has been claimed to be 150 previous 
Indigenous-specific programs.8
While this may seem, organisationally, like a return to 
experimenting with Indigenous-specific programs and 
structures as in the 1970s to 1990s, it is philosophically 
a continuation of the post-millennial experiments in 
welfare reform, contractualism and normalisation. The 
Abbott government’s threefold slogan of ‘getting children 
to school, adults to work and making (Indigenous) 
communities safer’ is redolent of the Noel Pearson–
CYIPL welfare reform agenda. Also, funding within the 
Indigenous Advancement Strategy is not restricted to 
organisations incorporated under the Corporations 
(Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006.9 Other 
organisations, such as general non-profit welfare 
organisations, for-profit businesses and universities, 
can also apply and compete for funding with Indigenous 
organisations, extending the trends of the post-ATSIC 
years. Alongside making Indigenous-specific programs 
more like general programs, this open competition for 
Indigenous Advancement Strategy funding can be seen 
as a form of normalisation.
One other aspect of the post-millennial and post-ATSIC 
experiments is an increasing focus on Indigenous people 
in remote areas and communities. Indigenous people 
in urban and regional areas have a lower profile and are 
often assumed to be accessing general government 
programs and services (even though they can still apply 
for Indigenous-specific funding). Reflecting this trend, 
among the five broad streams of funding within the 
Abbott government’s new Indigenous Advancement 
Strategy is one called ‘Remote Australia Strategies’. This 
seems to cover infrastructure and housing in discrete 
Indigenous communities in remote areas, which have 
always been large-budget items within Indigenous-
specific funding. However, it is not entirely clear at this 
stage what funding comes within the five streams of the 
Indigenous Advancement Strategy and what funding falls 
outside it. An interesting example of the latter is RJCP, 
referred to earlier, which began in July 2013, just two 
months before the Abbott government was elected.
RJCP is a general remote-area employment and 
community participation program, rather than an 
Indigenous-specific one. It reflects the trend away from 
Indigenous-specific programs in recent years, or at 
least their integration and standardisation with general 
programs wherever possible. When, in the September 
2013 election campaign, the Coalition declared its policy 
of relocating ‘Indigenous programmes’ to the Department 
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Coalition 2013), it was 
not clear that tRJCP would fall within this frame. However, 
within a week of winning government, machinery of 
government changes made clear that RJCP would be 
brought into the Department of the Prime Minster and 
Cabinet, because of its predominant relevance to remote 
Indigenous people. A year on, it is still unclear how 
contracts with RJCP providers will relate to Indigenous 
Advancement Strategy funding. RJCP contracts started 
in July 2013 and can run for up to five years, giving 
providers a funding stream outside the Indigenous 
Advancement Strategy for another four years. However, 
‘Jobs, Land and Economy’ is one of the five broad 
streams of funding within the Indigenous Advancement 
Strategy, which would seem as open to RJCP provider 
organisations as others.
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Although there is uncertainty in the Abbott government’s 
Indigenous affairs experiments, some basic trends 
are clear. This is not a return to the experiments with 
Indigenous-specific structures of the 1970s to 1990s, 
informed by ideas of Indigenous group autonomy and 
self-determination. Rather, the Abbott government 
is continuing the experiments of the post-millennial 
phase, informed by ideas of responsibility, welfare 
reform and economic opportunity, as well as ideas of 
competitive contractualism and normalisation within 
government service arrangements. Even though much 
Indigenous affairs activity is now occurring within 
one Commonwealth organisation, and there is talk of 
constitutional recognition using a peoples approach, 
this should not lead us to conclude that experimentalism 
under the Abbott Coalition government is conceptually 
very different from that of the post-millennial phase 
more generally.
Conclusion
There is a profound truth in Rowse’s idea, quoted at the 
outset, that ‘every project of government’ in Indigenous 
affairs is an ‘exploratory testing’ of ‘human sameness and 
cultural difference’. Indigenous affairs experimentalism 
occurs at a number of levels from the philosophical to the 
organisational. Experiments with different administrative 
arrangements for Indigenous affairs emerge and 
change in tandem with the continual rebalancing of the 
competing philosophical principles. There are probably 
no ultimate right answers to these philosophical and 
organisational issues in the exploratory testing of equality 
and difference. But analytic and historical awareness may 
help us refine and improve experiments through time. 
This paper has attempted to contribute to such analytic 
and historical awareness.
Notes
1. Whether there are three or four positions of principle around 
this triangle is open to debate. Rowse 2002: 5-17 recounts a 
debate in which Robert Manne argues for the importance of 
cultural diversity or difference as of value in itself and hence 
also a principle in Indigenous affairs. Rowse characterises 
this as a conservative ‘communitarian’ view and contrasts it 
with his own ‘libertarian’ position focused more on ‘choice’:
 ‘If the result of Indigenous Australians’ choices over the 
next few generations is that there is a reduction in cultural 
diversity, then from the point of view outlined in my letter 
I would not see it as a ‘tragedy’, but as an acceptable 
consequence of maximising Indigenous choice’ 
(Rowse 2002: 7).
 Rowse continues, however, by noting ‘three difficulties’ he 
might have in ‘holding that position’ against Manne. 
 I acknowledge that valuing cultural diversity or difference 
is a fourth position of principle in Indigenous affairs, but 
also maintain that it is the positive and negative valuing 
of difference in the principles of choice and guardianship 
that set up the clearest competing dynamics of Indigenous 
affairs policy debates. Hence I still talk of the ECG triangle, 
rather than adding the D.
2. Valuing socio-economic equality in population sub-
groups involves an ‘objective’ definition of the interests 
of households and individuals who currently contribute 
to inequality in these measures. This objective definition 
of interests is suggestive of elements of guardianship. 
However, this view of ‘social justice’ is, as Rowse (2012b) 
notes, also very widely embraced by Indigenous people 
themselves, which somewhat detracts from the idea that 
this is a guardianship position. Hence the question mark 
next to guardianship (and choice) at this middle level of 
Fig. 2. In later figures I simply let individual legal equality and 
socio-economic equality in population subgroups stand as 
positions of principle in their own terms, without trying to 
relate them to the ideas of choice and guardianship.
3. The Commonwealth Social Services Act reached this point 
of having no references to ‘Aboriginal natives’ in 1966. The 
Commonwealth Electoral Act did not reach this point until 
1983, as from 1962 enrolment to vote was voluntary for 
‘Aboriginal natives of Australia’ but compulsory for other 
Australian citizens.
4. The review of ATSIC that provoked Latham’s move was 
conducted by an Aboriginal woman and two non-Indigenous 
male ex-politicians—one Labor and one Liberal. It had 
recommended that the ‘existing objects of the ATSIC Act 
should be retained’, but that there was ‘urgent need for 
structural change’ towards greater ‘regional’ control within 
the elected arm of ATSIC (Hannaford, Huggins & Collins 
2003: 5–8). ATSIC had many Indigenous critics over the 
years, as well as supporters. 
5. Since the 1990s, Newstart Allowance has been the new 
name for unemployment benefits. In the Work-for-the-Dole 
program, participants undertake work activities for their 
Newstart Allowance.
6. Back in May 2007, Pearson had supported his home town of 
Hope Vale making an agreement with the Commonwealth for 
housing investment (Pearson 2007).
7. Rowse’s example is Pat Dodson’s use of both in his 2012 
Ghandi Lecture.
8. See http://www.dpmc.gov.au/indigenous-affairs.
9. This Commonwealth legislation updated and replaced the 
Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976.
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